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THE QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The question presented for review is whether the Court 
of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Second 
Judicial District Court of Weber County finding that the 
Petitioner is not a member of the legistlatively protected 
class under the relevent provisions of the Engineer's and 
Surveyors' Licensing Act. Utah Code Annotated Section 58-22-1 
to 25 (1963) allowing Respondents to recover for breach of 
contract. 
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REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL REPORTS OF 
OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals opinion of February 12, 199 0, may 
be found in 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 8. 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Court of Appeals opinion of February 12, 1990, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2 (5) (1986), is 
reviewable as matter of discretion by a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah granted 
Petitioner's Exparte Motion for an Extension of Time to File 
for Writ of Certiorari to and including April 13, 1990, which 
Order was signed on March 14, 1990. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated Title 58, Chapter 22, Sections 2 
and 20 (1953, as amended) set out verbatim in Appendix A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This Petition involves the review of the opinion of 
the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the District 
Court in finding that Petitoner was not a member of the 
legislatively protected class under the Engineer's and 
Surveyors7 Licensing Act., Utah Code Annotated Section 58-22-1 
to -25 (1963) allowing Respondents to recover for breach of 
contract. 
This action was brought by the Petitioner against the 
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Respondent Corporation and Irey for breach of contract and 
breach of warranty for Respondent's manufacturing for the 
petitioner, an automatic terminal bolt-to-coil assembly machine 
under specific specifications. (R. 1-4, 122-128). 
Respondent Corporation counterclaimed for damages for 
beach of contract and unjust enrichment. (R. 108-118). 
Petitioner further claimed as an affirmative defense, 
that Respondent Corporation acted through its only employee, 
Respondent Irey, who was not a licensed engineer and therefore 
unable to maintain an action. (R. 120 and 121). 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT 
BELOW 
Trial of this action was to a jury who awarded the 
Respondent Corporation damages against the Petitioner in the 
amount of $92,500.00 together with accrued interest of 
$23,895.81, and costs of $285.45. (R. 323, 324 and 325). 
Prior to trial, Petitioner moved for Dismissal of 
Respondent's Counterclaim pursuant to a Motion for Summary 
Judgment based upon the fact that Respondent Irey, d/b/a the 
Respondent Corporation, was not a licensed engineer. (R. 129 
through 139, 141 through 153). 
The Motion was heard before the Honorable David E. 
Roth and the Motion denied pending evidence to be submitted at 
trial concerning material issues of fact. (R. 168 and 169) 
(Reporter's Transcript p. 6) (See Appendix C). 
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The Motion was renewed at the time of trial before the 
Honorable John F. Wahquist and denied as having been decided by 
the other District Court Judge, the Honorable David E. Roth. 
(Reporter's Transcript p. 3 through 7, 16 through 19) (See 
Appendix C). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Courts 
ruling that denied the Petitioner protection under the 
Engineer's and Surveyors' Licensing Act. 
C. RELEVANT FACTS TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
On or about November 2, 1982, Industrial Engineering 
and Manufacturing Corporation, of which the Respondent Irey was 
the president and owner, agreed to manufacture for Appellant an 
automatic terminal bolt-to-coil assembly machine under specific 
specifications. (R. 1, 2, 122, 123). The machine was to be 
capable of applying a stud to both ends of various diameter 
coils at a minimum rate of 600 coils per hour or as later 
modified to 400 coils per hour. (R. 34). 
At the time of entering into the contract to 
manufacture the assembly machine, the Respondent Irey was not 
licensed to practice engineering in the State of Utah. (R. 130). 
That Respondent Irey has no license to practice his 
claimed profession of engineering, no college degree, no formal 
education in engineering. (R. 130). 
Respondent Corporation had Joseph W. Lindsey, a self 
employed licensed engineer, review some aspects of previous 
designs completed by the Respondent Irey. (R. 14 5) (Reporter's 
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Transcript of Joseph W. Lindsey p. 2,7 and 24 affiliation with 
the Respondent Corporation, Respondent Irey, and the project to 
manufacture the assembly machine can be found in his testimony 
at trial. (See Appendix B, Reporter's Transcript of Joseph 
Lindsey p. 24, 15 and 29). Please note the following testimony: 
Q. If the machine wasn't working properly, then you 
consider yourself responsible for that machine, Mr. 
Lindsey? 
A. I did not consider myself responsible for whether 
or not the machine works. Again, as I explained to 
you in deposition and today, that is not a part of 
the certification. Certification only certifies to 
the strengths, to the proper choice of materials, the 
proper methods— 
Q. You've made no certifications to this machine by any 
certified drawings, have you? 
A. I have not stamped any drawings. I— not certified in 
that sense. 
Q. You have not — 
A. But my approval is the same thing. 
Q. You have not made any drawings on this particular 
machine, isn't that true? 
A. I don't ordinarily do drafting, no. 
Q. Isn't it true that Mr. Irey would design it, then 
bring it to you for your review of the items that were 
— you've talked about? 
-5-
That's correct in most cases. That I would review a 
design that was already done. And suggest whatever 
modifications that I felt were required to make better 
use of materials or to strengthen a part of required 
— in that capacity. 
Now, initially he came to you and you went with a 
chalk board talk on the machine, I guess, is that 
correct? 
That's correct. 
That was for design of the frame? 
He initially came to me with the entire concept. We 
broke it down into various functions, looked at 
modules that would be required to accomplish it. 
Was that initially on the blackboard is how you did 
that? 
Yes. 
In that review procession — or that process, was 
anything designed I guess by Mr. Irey and you reviewed 
it after that process. 
Oh, I'm sure there were a lot of cases where he made 
the suggestion and some where I made the suggestion, 
I'm sure that's possible, yes. 
As I understand, you're not an employee of Industrial 
Engineering and Manufacturing? 
That's correct. 
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Q. You're not an officer of Industrial Engineering and 
Manufacturing? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Did you ever meet with anybody at Pacific Chromalox 
concerning the machine? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. So as to different gauge coils, different size 
diameters, different lengths, you performed no 
projection test with those other than the ones you 
observed him having in the shop which are the — I 
guess the 25, 24 26 area? 
A. I never conductd any tests with the machine. 
Q. Maybe I asked you this, I apologize, did you make any 
drawings or designs at all for the machine? 
A. Not directly, no. 
The foregoing was direct testimony from Joseph W. 
Lindsey, 
That in excess of a year following the entering into 
the agreement by the parties, Respondent Corporation and Irey 
delivered to Petitioner the assembly machine which had been 
manufactured. (R. 2, 123). 
That the assembly machine did not fulfill the 
requirements set forth in the contract specification and did 
not operate properly. (R. 2, 123). The machine never produced 
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600 coils per hour or as later modified, 400 coils per hour and 
was always jamming. (R. 4 6 through 54). Mr. Lindsey only 
timed the seconds per cycle to produce a coil at 7.14 seconds. 
Mr. Lindsey then stated that is about 505 parts per hour. 
However, Mr. Lindsey never tested the machine on a continous 
basis and never saw more than 20 to 30 coils run at a time. 
Mr. Lindsey testified that in 1984 the machine was operating 
down around 200 to 250 parts per hour. (See Appendix B. 
Reporter's Transcript of Joseph Lindsey p. 14, 15 and 28). 
That subsequent thereto, Respondent removed the 
machine from Petitioners place of business in order that the 
equipment could be modified to operate in accordance with the 
specific conditions previously set. That the Respondent has 
been paid in full, the amount of $73,389.75, under the terms of 
the contract. 
That on or about May 21, 1985, Petitioner received a 
Writ of Attachment and Replevin for possession of the assembly 
machine. That on or about November 6, 1985, Petitioner filed 
an Amended Complaint and Respondent filed a Counterclaim on 
December 12, 1985. (R. 2, 123). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT 
QUESTION OF STATE LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN, 
BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS COURT 
Rule 43(4) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
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provides for review by a Writ of Certiorari when the Court of 
Appeals has decided an important question of state law 
which has not been, but should be, settled by this court. 
The important statute and question in this case, which 
has never been addressed by this court or any other in this 
state, decided by the Court of Appeals is U.C.A. Section 
58-22-20 and its application to an unlicensed engineer in part 
as follows: 
No person shall bring or maintain any action in the 
courts of this state for enforecement of any contract 
or recovery of any sums due in connection with the 
practice of engineering ... without alleging and 
proving that he was duly authorized to practice under 
the provisions of this act, and no firm, 
co-partnerhsip, corporation or joint stock association 
shall bring or maintain any action in the courts of 
this state for enforcement of any contract or the 
recovery of any sums due in connection with the 
practice of engineering ... without alleging and 
proving that such practice was carried on by 
professional engineers ... authorized to practice 
under the provisions of this act. 
The Utah Court of Appeals specifically states in their 
opinion that "there is no Utah case law specifically 
interpreting this provision or other, similar provisions". 
(Appendix D Court of Appeals Opinion p.9). Consequently, the 
interpretion of the above statute is of first impression and 
should be decided by this court for the following reasons: 
1. There is no Utah case law specifically 
interpreting the statutory provision or other similar 
provisions. 
2. The interpretation of the statute is of first 
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impression and should be decided by this court to provide 
consistency, uniformity and direction in the intrepretion of a 
statute that has substantial importance in the administration 
of equity, fairness and justice in this case. 
3. The standard established by the court of appeals 
in this case is not found in any statute or case law decision 
and is inconsistent with the clear language of the statute and 
its intent. 
4. That substantial injustice concerning the 
petitioner will result without this court providing clear 
interpretion of the provisions of the Engineers' and Surveyors' 
Licensing Act. 
II 
THE PANEL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED 
A QUESTION OF STATE LAW IN A WAY THAT IS IN 
CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the Respondent 
practiced engineering in the state of Utah without a license as 
defined by the Engineers' and Surveyors' Licensing Act defined 
at U.C.A. Section 58-22-2 (1963). The Court of Appeals also 
found that the Respondent comes under the provisions of the act 
and is not exempt from its provisions including Section 
58-22-20 which states in relevant part, that: 
No person shall bring or maintain any action in the 
courts of this state for enforcement of any contract 
or the recovery of any sums due in connection with the 
practice of engineering or land surveyingwithout 
alleging and proving that he was duly authorized to 
practice under the provisions of this act.... 
(Appendix Court of Appeals Opinion P. 7, 8, 9) 
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However, the Appeals Court then went on to rule that 
the Petitioner is not a member of the class the legislature 
intended to protect by the statute because Petitioner is not 
part of the lay public. (Appendix D. Court of Appeals Opinion 
p.11) 
The Court of Appeals indicates that the general rule 
concerning licensing statutes does not specifically provide, as 
does Section 58-22-20, that an unlicensed practitioner cannot 
maintain an action in the state's courts to enforce the terms 
of his contracts. The Appeals Court then proceeds to interpret 
the statute by case law dealing with other licensing statutes; 
those mainly dealing with construction contractors and none 
dealing with the Engineering Licensing Statute. (Appendix D 
Court of Appeals Opinion p. 9, 10). 
The legislature specifically placed Section 58-22-20 
in the statute because it deals with engineers and no other 
licensed occupations such as contractors. Engineers are part 
of a profession not generally used by the lay public and the 
engineering licensing statute recognizes this by the specific 
provision of 58-22-20 that an unlicensed practitioner cannot 
maintain an action in the state's courts to enforce the terms 
of his contracts. The statute does not indicate an intent to 
only be applicable to the lay public but specifically provides 
this provision since it is apart from other licensing statutes. 
Engineering is a profession that is almost always 
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employed by businesses and others in the same trade or 
profession. Few of the lay public would ever use or employ an 
engineer and consequently this explains why the legislature was 
specific in adding Section 58-22-20 to the Engineers Licensing 
Statute denying an unlicensed practitioner access to the courts 
to enforce the terms of contracts. This is a provision not 
found in the other licensing statutes in Utah as recognized by 
the Court of Appeals in their opinion. (Appendix D Court of 
Appeals Opinion p. 10). 
The Court of Appeals then proceeds to interpret 
Section 58-22-20 with cases decided upon general contractors 
licensing statutes. Clearly, the general lay public use 
contractors on a routine, customary and frequent basis unlike 
the services of an engineer which would normaly never be used 
by the lay public but be used by businesses and those in the 
same trade and profession. Accordingly, the legislature 
intended to separate the Engineering Licensing Statute apart 
from other licensing statutes to make sure it would be applied 
to engineers practicing their profession. Otherwise, the 
intent of the act would be null and void since the general lay 
public would rarely if every use the services of an engineer. 
The cases referred to by the Court of Appeals can be 
significantly distinguished from the Petitioner's case. First, 
the contractors cases do not concern the Engineering Licensing 
Statute and based upon the previous argument should not be 
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applied to engineers as for their profession concerning the 
distinction of being employed by the lay public or by 
businesses in the same trade or profession. 
The Court of Appeals relys upon Fillmore Prods., Inc. 
v. Western States Paving, Inc., 561 p. 2d 687, 689 (Utah 1977), 
Lingnell v. Berg, 593 p. 2d 800, 805 (Utah 1979) and on Loader 
v. Scott Construction Corp., 681 p. 2d 1227, 1229 (Utah 1984) 
cases dealing with contractors and not engineers in making its 
decision. These cases can be further distinguished from 
Petitionees case as follows: 
The Petitioner's case is distinguished from the 
Fillmore Products case, which also deals with a corporation, in 
that (1) the Respondents were not acting as a subcontractor to 
a party licensed as an engineer but Respondents were the 
contracting parties with the Petitioner and were the only 
contracting parties responsible for the manufacturing of the 
machine and (2) the project was not under the supervision, 
direction or control of a licensed project engineer. Mr. 
Lindsey, an engineer, had no control, direction or supervision 
over the Respondents or responsibility for the project. (T. 
24, 25). 
The Lignell case is likewise distinguishable from the 
case before the court in the following: 
1. Respondent Irey did not "just inadvertently" allow 
his license to lapse. Respondent Irey consciously and 
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willfully disregarded the licensing statute and practiced his 
alleged trade as an engineer without an education, a college 
degree or a license, contrary to civil and criminal law. 
Licensing did not merely require payment of a fee, but required 
testing and examination. It did require a demonstration of 
competence. Respondent Irey has no college degree, has no 
formal education and no license to practice his claimed 
profession of engineering. (Depo p. 3) (R. 130 and 131). 
In the Lignell case, the owners knew the contractor in 
his professional capacity and had done work with the contractor 
previously. Moreover, in Lignell, the owners became their own 
general contractor, a stature they had taken before with the 
unlicensed contractor. 
In the case before the court, the Petitioner had not 
had previous professional or trade experience with the 
Respondent Corporation nor Irey. The Petitioner was not aware 
that the Respondent, Richard F. Irey, doing business as 
Industrial Engineering and Manufacturing Corporation, had no 
formal education in engineering , had no college degree and had 
no license to prctice engineering in the state of Utah or any 
other state. (R. 131). Petitioner did not know the 
Respondents professionally or any other way. 
3. In the Lignell case, the contractor supplied a 
meterialmen's and labor bond. The court said they were better 
off with a bond than by merely complying with a license 
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statute. In the case before the court, no bond was posted. 
The Loader case is distinguished from Petitioner's 
case in that (1) the case deals with the contractors licensing 
statute and not the Engineering Licensing Act, (2) the 
unlicensed contractor fully performed the contract where the 
Respondent in this case did not fully perform and (3) the 
contractors unlicensed status was the result of a good faith 
mistake where in this case the Respondent did not just allow 
his license to lapse but consciously practiced his alleged 
trade without a license, education or college degree. (R. 130 
and 131). 
Facts of this case clearly should be interpreted with 
the understanding that the above cases deal with contractors 
and not engineers. The Court of Appeals holding that 
Petitioner is outside the intent of the Engineering Act, since 
Petitioner had employees that were licensed engineers and thus 
not in need of the protection of the licensing statute's intent 
to protect the lay public is a rule provided by the assumption 
that the engineering statute should not apply to businessees 
and those in the same trade or profession. However, the above 
cases are distinguished and the Engineering Licensing Act must 
be intended for all persons as a consequence that the lay 
public would rarely use an engineer. 
CONSLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted a statute 
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for the first time that should be decided by this court. The 
Court of Appeals7 interpretation is based upon Contractors 
Licening Statutes and not the Engineering Licensing Statute 
which specifically provides in Section 58-22-20 that an 
unlicensed practitioner cannot maintain an action in state 
court to enforce the terms of his contracts. The intent of the 
legislative statute must be to protect all persons since the 
statute would be null and void if it only applied to the lay 
public as a consequence that the lay public would rarely if 
ever use the services of an engineer. 
Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that this 
court decide the important question raised herein and 
judicially determine the intent and interpretation of the 
Engineers Licensing Statute and its application to the 
Petitioner and the Respondent in this case. 
Dated this 12th day of April, 1990. 
TIMOTHY VI} BLACKBURN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of April, 1990, 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing document were 
mailed, postage prepaid, to E.H. Frankhauser, Attorney for 
Respondent, at 243 East 4th South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
U^A < fr&Jl, w\ fcH W A -
TIMOTHY W) BLACKBURN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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APPENDIX A U.C.A. 58-22-2, 20 (1953, as amended) 
APPENDIX B Reporter's Transcript of 
Joseph W. Lindsey p. 2, 3, 7, 24, 25, 26 and 29 
APPENDIX C Reporter's Transcript, 
p. 3 through 7, 16 through 2 0 
APPENDIX D Court of Appeals Opinion 
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APPENDIX A U.C.A. 5 8 - 2 2 - 2 , 20 
(1953 , a s amended) 
58-22-1 REGISTRATION DEPARTMENT 
CHAPTER 22 
ENGINEERS AND LAND SURVEYORS 
Section 58-22-1. Purpose of act—Unlawful practices. 
58-22-2. Definitions. 
58-22-3. Administration of act—Committee—Members—Appointment—Term— 
Oath. 
58-22-4. Members of committee—Qualifications. 
58-22-5. Per diem and expenses. 
58-22-6. Removal of member—Grounds—Vacancies—Method of filling. 
58-22-7. Meetings—Officers—Quorum. 
58-22-8. Powers. 
58-22-9. Director to receive and account for money—Disposition—Expendi-
tures—Budget. 
58-22-10. Records—Register of applications for registration—Biennial report. 
58-22-11. Roster of registered professional engineers and registered land sur-
veyors. 
58-22-12. Applicants—Requirements. 
58-22-13. Issuance of certificate to persons currently qualified. 
58-22-14. Applications—Fees. 
58-22-15. Examinations—Scope. 
58-22-16. Certificate of registration—Contents. 
58-22-17. Expiration of certificates—Renewal—Fee. 
58-22-18. Duties of public bodies engaging in construction of public works. 
58-22-19. Revocation of certificates--0rounds—Charges of fraud, deceit, gross 
negligence, incompetency, or misconduct—Hearing—Reissuing— 
Appeals. 
58-22-20. Offenses—Misdemeanor—Injunctions—Enforcement of act—Author-
ity to practice under act prerequisite for bringing or maintaining 
action for services. 
58-22-21. Exemption. 
58-22-22. Existing certificates—Persons presently practicing engineering. 
58-22-1. Purpose of act—Unlawful practices.—In order to safeguard 
life, health, and property, and to promote the public welfare, any person 
in either public or private capacity practicing or offering to practice en-
gineering or land surveying, shall hereafter be required to submit evidence 
that he is qualified so to practice and shall be registered as hereinafter 
provided; and it shall be unlawful for any person to practice or to offer to 
practice in this state, engineering or land surveying, as defined in the pro-
visions of this act, or to use in connection with his name or otherwise as-
sume, use or advertise any title or description tending to convey the im-
pression that he is a professional engineer or land surveyor, unless such 
person has been duly registered under the provisions of this act. 
History: I*. 1955, ch. 118, §1. providing for a committee of engineering 
examiners for professional engineers and 
Title of Act. IsLiid surveyors and the appointment of its 
An act to regulate the practices of en- members; fixing the terms of the members 
gineering and land surveying; providing of said committee and defining its powers 
for the registration of qualified persons as and duties; setting forth the minimum 
professional engineers and land surveyors, qualifications and other requirements for 
and providing for the certification of en- registration; establishing fees with expira-
gineers-in-training; defining the terms tion and renewal requirements; imposing 
"engineer," "professional engineer," "en- certain duties upon the state and political 
gineer-in-training," "practice of engineer- subdivisions thereof in connection with 
ing," "land surveyor," and "practice of public work and providing for the enforce-
land surveying," "exempting persons, firms, ment of this act and penalties for its viola-
copartnerships, corporations and joint stock tion; and repealing chapter 10, Title 58, 
associations under certain conditions"; Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
660 
ENGINEERS AND LAND SURVEYORS 5 8 - 2 2 - 2 
Cross-Reference. 
Licensing of s ta t ionary engineers, 17-5-
37. 
Construction and application. 
The val idi ty and application of sections 
of this act are discussed in Skelton v. 
Lees, 8 U. (2d) 88, 329 P. 2d 389. 
Out-of-state licensee. 
Licensed Wyoming engineer and land 
surveyor may testify concerning survey 
he conducted in connection with a bound-
ary dispute in Utah though he was not 
licensed as a survevor in Utah. Cornia v. 
Pu tnam, 26 U. (2d) 354, 489 P. 2d 1001. 
Collateral References. 
Licenses<§= J l l(l) . 
53 C.J.S. Licenses § 30. 
Surveyors and civil engineers, 50 Am. 
Jur . 1149, Surveyors and Civil Engineers 
§ 1 et seq. 
Architect 's or engineer 's compensation 
as affected by inabil i ty to carry out plan 
or specifications at amount sat isfactory to 
employer, 127 A. L. R. 410. 
Consti tut ionali ty of s t a tu te regulat ing 
land surveyors or civil engineers, 55 A. L. 
R. 307. 
What amounts to engineering or archi-
tectural services within license require-
ments, 82 A. L. R. 2d 1013. 
DECISIONS U N D E R FORMER LAW 
Engineering and architecture. 
The professions of pract icing architec-
ture and professional engineering are re-
lated in some part iculars , and have a t 
least some activit ies in common and to 
tha t degree overlap; but this does not re-
quire one engaged in either to procure a 
license in the other simply because some 
of the act ivi t ies in one overlap the other. 
Smith v. American Pack ing & Provision 
Co., 102 U. 351, 130 P . 2d 951. 
Licensed engineer was not required to 
obtain architect 's license merely because 
his professional services happened to over-
lap with some a r c h i t e c t u r a l functions. 
Smith v. American Packing & Provision 
Co., 102 U. 351, 130 P . 2d 951. 
Field of professional engineering did not 
embrace entire field of architecture merely 
because of some overlapping of their re-
spective functions. Smith v. American 
Packing & Provision Co., 102 U. 351, 130 
P. 2d 951. 
Real criterion for deciding whether a 
licensed engineer had to have an archi-
tect 's license was whether his services 
were necessarily embraced by his engineer-
ing license, not whether such services 
could be lawfully performed by an archi-
tect. Smith v. American Pack ing & Pro-
vision Co., 102 U. 351, 130 P . 2d 951. 
Question of whether an engineer's activ-
ities were far enough away from engineer-
ing and close enough to archi tecture to 
require architect 's license would be de-
cided on case by case basis. Smith v. 
American Packing & Provision Co., 102 
U. 351, 130 P . 2d 951. 
The assembling of machinery and equip-
ment, and its proper co-ordination in the 
operation of a packing plant , appeared to 
be in the field of engineering. Smith v. 
American Packing & Provision Co., 102 U. 
351, 130 P. 2d 951. 
Rehabil i tat ion and remodeling of kill ing 
floor and meat department of packing 
plant was engineering, not archi tecture. 
Smith v. American Packing & Provision 
Co., 102 U. 351, 130 P . 2d 951. 
58-22-2. Definitions.—Certain words and phrases used in this act, 
unless contrary to or inconsistent with the context, are defined as follows: 
"Director" shall mean the director of registration of the state of Utah. 
"Department" shall mean the department of registration of the state of 
Utah. 
The term "engineer" as used in this act shall mean a "professional 
engineer" as hereinafter defined. 
The term "responsible charge" of work means the control and direction 
by the use of initiative, skill, and independent judgment, of the investiga-
tion or design of professional engineering work or the supervision of such 
projects. 
The term "professional engineer" within the meaning and intent of this 
act shall mean a person who, by reason of his special knowledge of the 
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mathematical and physical science and the principles and methods of en-
gineering analysis and design, acquired by professional education and prac-
tical experience, is qualified to practice engineering as hereinafter defined, 
as attested by his legal registration as a professional engineer. 
The term "engineer-in-training" as used in this act shall mean a 
candidate for registration as a professional engineer who is a graduate in 
an approved engineering curriculum of four years or more from a school or 
college approved by the committee as of satisfactory standing, or who has 
had four years or more of experience in engineering work of a charac-
ter satisfactory to the committee; and who, in addition, has successfully 
passed the examination in the fundamental engineering subjects prior to 
completion of the requisite years of experience in engineering work, as pro-
vided in section 58-22-15, and who shall have received from the committee, 
as hereinafter defined, a certificate stating that he has successfully passed 
this portion of the professional examinations. 
The term "practice of engineering," within the meaning and intent of 
this act, shall mean the performance of any professional service or creative 
work requiring engineering education, training and experience, and the 
application of special knowledge of the mathematical, physical, and engi-
neering sciences to such professional services or creative work as consulta-
tion, investigation, evaluation, planning, design, and supervision of con-
struction for the purpose of assuring compliance with specifications and 
design, in connection with the utilization of the forces, energies, and ma-
terials of nature in the development, production, and functioning of en-
gineering processes, apparatus, machines, equipment, facilities, buildings, 
structures, works, or utilities, or any combinations or aggregations thereof 
employed in or devoted to public or private enterprise or uses. The term 
"practice of engineering" comprehends the practice of those branches of 
engineering, the pursuit of any of which affects the safety of life, health 
or property, or the public welfare. Said practice includes the doing of such 
architectural work as is incidental to the practice of engineering. 
A person shall be construed to practice or offer to practice engineering, 
within the meaning and intent of this act, who practices any branch of the 
profession of engineering; or who, by verbal claim, sign, advertisement, 
letterhead, card, or in any other way represents himself to be a professional 
engineer, or through the use of some other title implies that he is a pro-
fessional engineer; or who holds himself out as able to perform, or who 
does perform any engineering service or work or any other professional 
service designated by the practitioner or recognized by educational au-
thorities as engineering. 
The practice of engineering shall not include the work ordinarily per-
formed by persons who operate or maintain machinery or equipment. 
The term "land surveyeor" as used in this act shall mean a person who 
engages in the practice of land surveying as hereinafter defined. 
The practice of ldnd surveying within the meaning and intent of this 
act includes surveying of areas for their correct determination and de-
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scription and for conveyancing, or for the establishment or re-establishment 
of land boundaries and the plotting of lands and subdivisions thereof. 
The term "committee" as used in this act shall mean the representative 
committee of professional engineers and land surveyors provided for by 
this act. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 118, § 2. Skelton v. Lees, 8 U. (2d) 88, 329 P. 2d 
389. 
Construction and application. 
This act broadened the field of control Collateral References, 
beyond the three principal fields of me- Liceu8es<§=>ll(l). 
chanical, civil, and electrical engineering. 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 1. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Architects and engineers. ities overlapped those of an architect. 
Former section 58-10-2 did not require Smith v. American Packing & Provision 
an engineer to qualify under chapter 3 of Co., 102 U. 351, 130 P. 2d 95L 
this title simply because some of his activ-
58-22-3. Administration of act—Committee—Members—Appointment— 
Term—Oath.—The administration of this act is hereby devolved upon the 
department of registration. The committee shall consist of seven profes-
sional engineers, one of whom shall be a land surveyor, who shall be ap-
pointed by the director from among the nominees recommended by the 
representative engineering societies in the state and shall have the qualifica-
tions required by section 58-22-4. The members of the committee of engi-
neering examiners, as it is constituted at the time of passage of this act, are 
continued in office until the expiration of their terms, at which time the 
director shall make an appointment as hereinbefore provided for a period 
of three years. Said members shall serve from the date of their appointment 
until the expiration of their terms or until their successors are duly ap-
pointed and qualified. Every member of the committee shall receive a cer-
tificate of his appointment from the director and before beginning his term 
of office shall file with the secretary of state his written oath or affirmation 
for the faithful discharge of his official duty. On the expiration of the term 
of any member, the director shall, in the manner hereinbefore provided, ap-
point for a term of three years a registered professional engineer, having 
the qualifications required by section 58-22-4, to take the place of the mem-
ber on said committee whose term is about to expire. Each member shall 
hold office until the expiration of the term for which such member is ap-
pointed and until a successor shall have been duly appointed and qualified. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 118, §3. of engineers. Skelton v. Lees, 8 U. (2d) 
88, 329 P. 2d 389. 
Effect of repeal. 
The repeal of former chapter 10 and the CoUateral References. 
enactment of this chapter effected a Licenses<$=>21. 
change of the whole administrative setup 53 CJ.S. Licenses § 37. 
and also the qualifications for registration 
58-22-4. Members of committee—Qualifications.—Each member of the 
committee shall be a citizen of the United States and a resident of this 
state, and shall have been engaged in the practice of engineering for at least 
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court. After receipt of said notice the director shall promptly file with the 
district court a copy of the proceedings had before the committee. The 
case shall come up for hearing before the district court upon filing and 
service of notice by either party. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 118, § 19. 
Nature of review on appeal. 
In reviewing an action taken by the 
department of registration, the district 
court is limited to a review of the record 
and is bound by the established rules ap-
plicable to such reviews. Skelton v. Lees, 
8 U. (2d) 88, 329 P. 2d 389. 
58-22-20. Offenses—Misdemeanor—Injunctions—Enforcement of act— 
Authority to practice under act prerequisite for bringing or maintaining ac-
tion for services.—Any person who shall practice, or offer to practice, en-
gineering or land surveying in this state without being registered in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this act, or any person presenting or 
attempting to use as his own the certificate of registration or the seal of an-
other, or any person who shall give any false or forged evidence of any kind 
to the director or committee or to any member thereof in obtaining a cer-
tificate of registration, or any person who shall falsely impersonate any 
other registrant of like or different name, or any person who shall attempt 
to use an expired or revoked certificate of registration, or any person who 
shall violate any of the provisions of this act, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor. 
Any person who shall practice, or offer to practice engineering or land 
surveying in this state without being registered in accordance with the 
provisions of this act, may be enjoined by the district court from practicing 
engineering or land surveying until such person shall have been lawfully 
registered under this act. 
It shall be the duty of all duly constituted officers of the law of this 
state, or any political subdivision thereof, to enforce the provisions of this 
act and to prosecute and enjoin any persons violating same. The attorney 
general of the state or his assistant shall act as legal adviser of the director 
and committee and render such legal assistance as may be necessary in 
carrying out the provisions of this act 
No person shall bring or maintain any action in the courts of this state 
for enforcement of any contract or the recovery of any sums due in con-
nection with the practice of engineering or land surveying in this state as 
defined herein, without alleging and proving that he was duly authorized 
to practice under the provisions of this act, and no firm, copartnership, 
corporation or joint stock association shall bring or maintain any action in 
the courts of this state for enforcement of any contract or the recovery of 
any sums due in connection with the practice of engineering or land survey-
ing, in this state as defined herein, without alleging and proving that such 
practice was carried on by professional engineers or land surveyors re-
spectively authorized to practice under the provisions of this act. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 118, § 20. 
573 
Operation and effect of section. 
The effect of this section is to provide 
a method for review by the courts of all 
matters arising under this chapter and it 
is improper to look to 58-1-36 for the 
method of review. Skelton v. Lees, 8 U. 
(2d) 88, 329 P. 2d 389. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT Or WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* - * * • * • * 
PACIFIC CHROMOLOX DIVISION. 
EMERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VC. 
RICHARD F. IREY AND INDUSTRIAL 




C I V I L NO. 92l29lZi 
TESTIMONY OF: 
JOSEPH W. LINDSEY 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY 
FOR HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN F. WAHLQUIST, JUDGE, 
SITTING WITH A JURY AT OGDEN, UTAH ON THE 1ETH, 13TH, 1GTH, 
AND 17TH DAYS OF NOVEMBER 1987. 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
* * • * • * • + • 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT. 
TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN 
E.H. FANKHAUSER 
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D l i . L L T BY MR. F A N K H A U S E R : f- j . 
CROSS BY MR. B L A C K B U R N : ^ 
R E D I R E C T BY MR. F A N K H A U S E R : 3S 
RECRGSS BY MR. B L A C K B U R N : *o 
FURTHER REDIRECT BY MR. FANKK^USER: 4 1 
+ •#-•»*<« 
UGDLN^UTAH NQVEMBER^iG^J^::.;y 4 : Op P. ML 
MR. FANKHAUSER: CALL MR. LINDSEY In THE STAND PLEASE. 
JOSEPH W. LINDSL * . 
CALLED AS A WITNESS. BEING Fi tlSl DUL'Y SWORN 
WAS EXHMINED WND TESTIFIED H- FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATIUN 
BY MR. FMNKHMUSER: 
Q WOULD YOU STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE COURT AND RECORD 
PLEASE? 
|H MY NAME IS JOSEPH W. LINDSEY. 
Q WHERE DO YOU RESIDE. MR. LINDSEY? 
|A IN SANDY. UTAH. 
Q AND ARE YOU EMPLOYEDn 
|A SELF-EMPLOYED. 
p HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN SELF-EMPLOYLD. MR. LINDSEY? 
SINCE 1975. 
|Q IN WHAT CAPACITY ARE YOU SELF -EMPLUYLV~' 


























U AND WHAT ft RE YOUR QUALIFICATIONS- THAT WOULD -- I SHOULD 
SAY. WHAT ARE YOUR AREAS OF EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE THAT 
WOULD QUALIFY YOU TO bE A CONSULTING ENGINEER? 
(A I HAVE A BACHELOR'S AND A MASTER'S DEGREE IN MECHANICAL 
ENGINEERING FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH. I COMPLETED ALL OF 
THE CLASS WORK REQUIREMENTS FOR H PH.D. IN MECHANICAL 
ENGINEERING AND ALSO IN CHEMICAL ENGINEERING FROM THE 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH. 
|0 WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE TO GET YOUR DOCTORATE? 
A JUST THE THESIS. 
Q OKAY. AND HAVE YOU HAD ANY PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN THE 
FIELD OF ENGINEERING? 
IA YES. I'VE WORKED SINCE I960 IN THE FIELD OF ENGINEERING. 
Q AND WAS THIS AS A SELF-EMPLOYED CONSULTANT OR WORKING FOR 
[OTHER COMPANIES"' 
|A NO. I WORKED EIGHT AND A HHLF YEARS FOR HERCULES, 
INCORPORATED. I WORKED ABOUT FOUR YEARS FOR IMPERIAL EASTMAN. 
I WAS A FULL-TIME CONSULTANT FOR TWO YEARS FOR JOHNSON AND 
JOHNSON. I OWNED AND OPERATED MY OWN BUSINESS SINCE 1971, A 
LOT OF THAT CONCURRENT WITH SOME OF THE OTHER WORK. 
IQ IN THE COURSE OF YOUR WORK FOR OTHER COMPANIES AS WELL AS 
YOURSELF, HAVE YOU EVER MANUFACTURED OR DEVELOPED ANY 
INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT OR MACHINERY? 
IA YES, QUITE A BIT. 



























Q DURING THPT TIME DID YOU SHARE ANY SHOP FACILITIES? 
A YES. DICK HAD AN OPERATION THAT HE DID A LOT OF 
ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLY OVER THERE, AND NEEDED SOME SHEET METAL 
|WORK AND OCCASIONALLY SOME MACHINE SHOP WORK. AND I MADE MY 
SHEET METAL AND MACHINE SHOP AVAILABLE TO HIM. SOMETIMES HE 
|WOULD COME AND USE IT, SOMETIMES HE WOULD HAVE A MAN COME IN 
AND RUN MY MACHINES OR SOMETIMES WE WOULD DO THE WORK FOR HIM. 
IQ OKAY. NOW, ARE YOU A LICENSED PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER IN 
THE STATE OF UTAH? 
|A YES, I AM. 
P HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN SO LICENSED? 
A I'M NOT POSITIVE THE DATE, BUT I WOULD PUT IT IN 1973, 
1974. 
|Q IS YOUR LICENSE CURRENT? 
A YES, IT IS. 
(Q WAS YOUR LICENSE IN EFFECT AND CURRENT DURING THE YEARS 
•8£ THROUGH '65? 
|A YES. 
P WHEN DID YOU FIRST BECOME INVOLVED ON THE PACIFIC 
CHROMOLOX JOB, MR. LINDSEY? 
|A DICK CALLED ME ONE DAY AND SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A MEETING 
AT CHROMOLOX, AND ASKED ME IF I WOULD COME IN AND DISCUSS WITH 
LJIM SOME OF THE CONCEPTS THAT HE FELT THAT HE COULD USE IN 
MEETING THEIR REQUIREMENTS. AND I CAME IN AND WE DID THAT. 



























Q NOW, DID YOU SEE THE MACHINE OPERATE IN THAT TIME FRAME, 
|SAY, FEBRUARY, MARCH 1985? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q DID YOU EVER HAVE OCCASION TO TIME IT? 
A YES. 
Q AND WHEN YOU TIMED IT, WHAT DID YOU FIND ITS PRODUCTION 
RATE WAS? 
[A WELL, I WAS ASKED THAT QUESTION EARLIER IN THE 
DEPOSITION, AND AT THAT POINT I COULDN'T REMEMBER. TIMED IT 
AGAIN FROM THE VIDEO TAPE YOU JUST SAW — 
Q THE VIDEO TAPE WE'VE DISPLAYED HERE? 
A YES. 
Q OKAY. 
A IN FACT, I HAVE TIMED IT AND RE-TIMED IT PROBAPLY 50 
TIMES IN THE LAST WEEK, AND I GET AN AVERAGE OF AROUND 7.14 
SECONDS PER CYCLE. 
Q WHAT DOES THAT — 
A THAT' S ABOUT 505 PARTS. 
Q PER HOUR? 
[A PER HOUR. 
|Q NOW, BASED ON YOUR EXPERTISE AND YOUR EXPERIENCE IN THE 
ENGINEERING FIELD, DO YOU HAVE AN OPINION AS TO WHETHER OR NOl 
THIS PARTICULAR MACHINE IS WHAT THEY TERM TO BE A CONTINUOUS 
OPERATION TYPE MACHINE? 



























MINUTE — MACHINE HAS NEVER BEEN OPERATED ON A CONTINUOUS 
BASIS. CONTINUOUS OPERATION TO ME MEANS THAT THE MACHINE 
ITSELF WILL NOT FAIL, NOT — NOT THAT THE MACHINE WILL NOT 
(FUNCTION ON THE PARTS BEING PRODUCED. YOU' RE TALKING ABOUT A 
CONTINUOUS OPERATION ON THE MACHINE, YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THE 
[CAPABILITY OF THE MACHINE TO STAND UP UNDER THE WEAR AND TEAR 
OF CONTINUOUS USE. 
Q WELL, THAT'S ONE OF THE FUNCTIONS IS TO DETERMINE THE 
STRUCTURAL SOUNDNESS OF THIS PARTICULAR MACHINE, ISN'T THAT 
ICORRECT? 
A THAT' S CORRECT. 
|Q AND YOU DID SOME OF THOSE CALCULATIONS WITH REGARD TO 
STRESS AND THE ACTUAL — 
[A THAT'S CORRECT, AND I BELIEVE IT — IN THAT CAPACITY, THE 
MACHINE WILL MEET THAT, BUT THAT'S YET TO BE PROVEN. 
|Q I SEE. THAT WOULD BE PROVEN BY A TRUE PRODUCTION RUN OR 
SOME OTHER FORM — 
|A THE ONLY WAY YOU CAN EVER PROVE THAT IS TO PUT IT INTO 
FUNCTION AND LET IT RUN WITH AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME AND 
[SEE WHAT WEAR FACTORS YOU GET ON THE WEAR PARTS, TO SEE WHAT 
BREAKAGES YOU WOULD GET ON CRITICAL PARTS. ONLY ONE WAY TO 
(PROVE IT, THAT'S TO RUN THE MACHINE. 
Q NOW, THERE'S BEEN SOME TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE ABOUT THIS 
MACHINE NOT BEING ADAPTED OR CONSTRUCTED FOR CONVENIENT 



























A OVERALL. MAKING SURE THAI • > •" COMPLIES WITH GOOD 
ENGINEERING PRACTICE AND MANUFACTURING, YES. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: THANK YOU. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BLACKBURN: 
0 IF THE MACHINE WASN'T WORKING PROPERLY, THEN YOU CONSIDER 
YOURSELF RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT MACHINE, MR. LINDSEY? 
A I DID NOT CONSIDER MYSELF RESPONSIBLE FOR WHETHER OR NOT 
THE MACHINE WORKS. AGAIN. AS I EXPLAINED TO YOU IN DEPOSITION 
AND TODAY, THAT IS NOT A PART OF THE CERTIFICATION. 
CERTIFICATION ONLY CERTIFIES TCI I Mb fj I'RF Nf^ THfii, 10 nil PROPER 
CHOICE OF MATERIALS, THE PROPER METHODS — 
Q YOU'VE MADE NO CERTIFICATIONS TO THIS MACHINE BY ANY 
CERTIFIED DRAWINGS, HAVE YOU? 
A I HAVE NOT STAMPED ANY DRAWINGS. I — NOT CERTIFIED IN 
THAT SENSE. 
Q YOU HAVE NOT — 
A BUT MY APPROVAL IS THE SAME THING. 
Q YOU HAVE NOT MADE ANY DRAWINGS ON THIS PARTICULAR 
(MACHINE, ISN'T THAT TRUE? 
A I DON' IRDINARIL^. Dfl DHAFTINb. NO. 
Q ISN'T TRUE THAT MR. IREY WOULD DESIGN IT, THEN BRING 
IT TO YOU FOR YOUR REVIEW OF THE ITEMS THAT WERE — YOU'VE 
TALKED ABOUT? 


























DESIGN THAT WAS ALREADY DONE. AND SUGGEST WHATEVER 
MODIFICATIONS THAT I FELT WERE REQUIRED TO MAKE BETTER USE OF 
MATERIALS OR TO STRENGTHEN A PART OF REQUIRED — IN THAT 
CAPACITY. 
jQ NOW, INITIALLY HE CAME TO YOU AN'D YOU WENT WITH A CHALK 
BOARD TALK ON THE MACHINE, I GUESS, IS THAT CORRECT? 
|A THAT' S CORRECT. 
Q THAT WAS FOR DESIGN OF THE FRAME? 
|A HE INITIALLY CAME TO ME WITH THE ENTIRE CONCEPT. WE 
BROKE IT DOWN INTO VARIOUS FUNCTIONS, LOOKED AT MODULES THAT 
MOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH IT. 
Q WAS THAT INITIALLY ON THE BLACKBOARD IS HOW YOU DID THAT? 
A YES. 
|Q IN THAT REVIEW PROCESSION — OR THAT PROCESS, WAS 
ANYTHING DESIGNED I GUESS BY MR. IREY AND YOU REVIEWED IT 
(AFTER THAT PROCESS? 
|A OH, I'M SURE THERE WERE A LOT OF CASES WHERE HE MADE THE 
SUGGESTION AND SOME WHERE I MADE THE SUGGESTION, I'M SURE 
[THAT'S POSSIBLE, YES. 
|Q AS I UNDERSTAND, YOU' RE NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF INDUSTRIAL 
ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING? 
(A THAT'S CORRECT. 
P YOU'RE NOT AN OFFICER OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND 
[MANUFACTURING? 



























Q YOU RECEIVED — OR DID YOU RECEIVE MONEY FOR THIS 
PARTICULAR — 
A YES, I DID. IN FACT, I DID. I DID. I RECEIVED •£, 000. 
Q WAS THAT ON THIS PARTICULAR PROJECT? 
A ON THIS PROJECT, YES. 
Q AND OfHr R 7 HAN IHil'l, Y'LIU TRADED BACK AND FORTH WITH MR. 
IREY? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOU RECEIVE SOME STOCK IN THE COMPANY? 
A BACK WHEN WE ORIGINALLY MADE OUR ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN US 
TO — FOR HIM TO USE ME AS A CONSULTANT AND FOR ME TO USE HIM 
AS A CONSULTANT, AT THAT TIME HE OWED ME SOME MONEY FOR SOME 
WORK THAT I HAD ALREADY DONE FOR HIM. SO AS A WAY OF PAYING 
THAT OFF AND AS AN ENTICEMENT TO CONSUMMATE THE AGREEMENT THAT 
WE HAD BETWEEN US, YES, I DID END UP TAKING $40,000 OF STOCK 
IN THE COMPANY. 
:Q DID HE GIVE YOU A STOCK CERTIFICATE FOR THAT STOCK? 
A YES, HE DID. 
Q AND THAT WAS IN EXCHANGE FOR LABOR, NO MONEY TRANSACTED 
ACROSS. IT WAS — HE OWED YOU SOME MONEY AND GAVE YOU THE 
STOCK FOR THE MONEY HE OWED YOU? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
|Q DID YOU EVER MEET WITH ANYBODY AT PACIFIC CHROMOLOX 
CONCERNING THE MACHINE? 


























Q DO YOU RECALL WHEN YOU DID THAT? 
A OFF AND ON SEVERAL TIMES THROUGH THE MACHINE'S 
DEVELOPMENT. 
Q WELL, CAN YOU GIVE US ANY DATES, JUST — 
A NO. 
Q — OR TIMES? 
A I COULDN' T. 
Q CAN YOU GIVE US ANY RESULTS? 
A YES. EARLY IN THE MACHINE'S DESIGN, YOU WERE LOOKING AT 
— AND I CAN'T VERIFY THAT AT THIS DATE THAT I TOOK A TEST AND 
IT WAS THIS MANY SECONDS, BUT THE COLLECTIVE IMPRESSION FROM 
SEVERAL TESTS WAS THAT THE MACHINE WAS OPERATING DOWN AROUND 
£00, 250 PARTS PER HOUR FOR — I WOULD SAY ABOUT 'S3, '84, 
THROUGH THERE. 
Q CAN YOU REMEMBER HOW MANY PARTS WERE PUT THROUGH THE 
MACHINE TO DETERMINE YOUR PROJECTION IN '33 AND '84 AT 200, 
£5© PARTS? 
A I NEVER SAW MORE THAN, SAY, 20 TO 30 COILS RUN AT A TIME. 
Q DID YOU SEE DIFFERENT TYPE GAUGE COILS AND DIFFERENT SIZE 
DIAMETER COILS RUN OR WERE THEY ALL THE SAME SIZE? 
A I NEVER MEASURED THEM TO SEE WHAT SIZE THEY WERE. THE 
COILS THAT DICK HAD AT HIS SHOP TO TEST I THINK WERE MOSTLY OF 
THE MIDDLE RUN SIZES. IT'S BEEN TESTIFIED HERE THAT THOSE 
FELL IN THE 25, 2fc GAUGE RANGE. I NEVER FELT IT WAS MY PLACE 




























WOULD RELY UPON HIM. 
Q SO AS TO DIFFERENT GAUGE COILS, DIFFERENT SIZE DIAMETERS, 
DIFFERENT LENGTHS, YOU PERFORMED NO PROJECTION It'-l WITH THOSE 
OTHER THAN THE ONES YOU OBSERVED HIM HAVING IN THE SHOP WHICH 
ARE THE — I GUESS THE £5, £4, £6 AREA? 
|A I NEVER CONDUCTED ANY TESTS WITH THE MACHINE. 
Q OKAY. 
A WHETHER IT WAS RUNNING IT OR . ••» ANYTHING ELSE, 
OTHER THAN — OTHER THAN THE TIME SEQUENCES THAT I WATCHED 
MYSELF AND VOLUNTARILY TIMED, I HAVE OBSERVED SEVERAL OF THE 
MODULES IN MODULAR FUNCTION ON THE BENCH, AND I WAS THERE A 
NUMBER OF TIMES WHEN SOMEONE ELSE WAS OPERATING THE MACHINE, 
BUT I NEVER RAN THE MACHINE. 
O MAYBE I ASKED YOU THIS, I APOLOGIZE, DID YOU MAKE ANY 
DRAWINGS OR DESIGNS AT ALL FOR THE MACHINE? 
pi NOT DIRECTLY, NO. 
P DO YOU REMEMBER ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS THAT DICK WAS HAVING 
WITH THE MACHINE A'L IT WAS BEINli BUILT"? 
|A YES. 
p WHAT WERE THOSE PROBLEMS? 
A THERE WAS A PROBLEM OF COURSE WITH T U P H R I E N T E R . I SAY 
MAJOR PROBLEMS, MAJOR IN THE SENSE THAT . WAS AN ONGOING 
STRUGGLE. I DON'T 1H1NK FHfRF WAS ANV P i r- HERE. THAT I 
(WOULD SAY WAS MAJOR IN THE SENSE THAT I DIDN'T FEEL THAT IT 
COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED OR THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH 
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PLAINTIFF. IN ORDER FOR THEM TO DO THAT, AND THEY HAVE 
ALLEGED THAT THE CORPORATION WAS A SHAM AND A FRAUD. AND HERE 
AGAIN. THERE'S ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT THAT 
THAT IS THE SITUATION HERE AT ALL. AND I WOULD MOVE THE COURT 
THAT THESE MATTERS BE DISMISSED. FURTHER, THE BURDEN WITH 
REGARD TO THE SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF MUST BE CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE RATHER THAN A MERE PREPONDERANCE. AND I 
BELIEVE I WOULD ADDRESS THE COURT TO THE DOCKSTADER CASE, 
WHICH SAYS YOU MUST PROVE THAT THE CORPORATION ENTITY WAS 
lUSED, QUOTE, UNQUOTE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF PERPETRATING A FRAUD 
OR SOME OTHER TYPE OF INJURY OR TORT IN ORDER TO PIERCE THE 
CORPORATE VEIL, AND THAT MUST BE PROVED BY CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE. BASED ON THAT WE ASK THOSE TWO CLAIMS BE 
[DISMISSED FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
MR. BLACKBURN: WE HAVE NO OBJECTION. 
THE COURT: GRANT BOTH MOTIONS. 
MR. BLACKBURN: YOUR HONOR, AT THIS TIME WE WOULD MAKE A 
|MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF — EXCUSE ME, DEFENDANTS' 
COUNTERCLAIM BASED UPON SECTION 58-££-£iZi, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
IWHICH READS THIS: "NO PERSON SHALL BRING OR MAINTAIN ANY 
ACTION IN THE COURTS OF THIS STATE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ANY 
(CONTRACT OR THE RECOVER OF ANY SUMS DUE IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
PRACTICE OF ENGINEERING OR LAND SURVEYING IN THIS STATE AS 
(DEFINED HEREIN WITHOUT ALLEGING AND PROVING THAT HE WAS DULY 


























NO FIRM, CO-PARTNERSHIP, CORPORATION OR JOINT STOCK 
ASSOCIATION SHALL BRING OR MAINTAIN ANY ACTION IN THE COURTS 
OF THIS STATE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ANY CONTRACT OR THE RECOVERY 
OF ANY SUMS DUE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRACTICE OF ENGINEERING 
OR LAND SURVEYING IN THIS STATE AS DEFINED HEREIN WITHOUT 
ALLEGING AND PROVING THAT SUCH PRACTICE WAS CARRIED ON BY 
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS OR LAND SURVEYORS RESPECTIVELY 
AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT." 
THERE'S NO ALLEGATION IN THEIR COUNTERCLAIM THAT THE 
CORPORATION — THAT THERE'S ANY AUTHORIZED ENGINEERS LICENSED 
TO PRACTICE ENGINEERING IN THIS STATE IN THEIR COUNTERCLAIM — 
THE COURT: JUST A MOMENT. WASN'T THIS MOTION 
PRESENTED TO THE OTHER JUDGE? 
MR. BLACKBURN: NO. THE MOTION BEFORE THE OTHER JUDGE 
WAS SIMPLY THAT THE — THERE WAS NO ENGINEERING. IT WAS THAT 
THE — THERE WAS NOT AN ENGINEER. IT WAS NOT THAT THEY DID 
NOT ALLEGE IT IN THEIR COMPLAINT. WE DIDN'T BRING IT AT THAT 
TIME BECAUSE PERHAPS THEY COULD HAVL AMENDED IT. THERE IS NO 
ALLEGATION IN THEIR COMPLAINT. THE ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT, 
WHETHER THERE WAS A LICENSED ENGINEER WORKING FOR THE COMPANY, 
HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH ALLEGING IT IN THEIR COMPLAINT. NO 
ALLEGATION WHATSOEVER IN THE COUNTERCLAIM. THEY'RE BARRED FROM 
MAINTAINING AN ACTION BECAUSE THFY I.M I NGl HAVE THAT ALLEGATION 
IN THEIR COUNTERCLAIM. 


























MR. FANKHAUSER: WELL. YOUR HONOR, I DISAGREE WITH COUNSEL 
ON THAT RESPECT. NUMBER ONE — I'M LOOKING FOR THE MEMORANDUM 
WHICH WE SUBMITTED; HOWEVER. THEY'RE ON FILE. THIS MATTER WAS 
iARGUED BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION BEFORE JUDGE ROTH AND IT WAS 
DENIED AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME. FURTHERMORE. COUNSEL WAS WELL 
PLACED ON NOTICE OF THAT PARTICULAR DEFENSE, ALTHOUGH WE DID 
NOT FORMALLY MODIFY OUR COUNTERCLAIM TO ALLEGE THAT. IT'S OUR 
[POSITION AS SET FORTH IN THE COUNTERCLAIM THAT THAT IS NOT 
NECESSARY WHERE THIS IS NOT A PARTY. QUOTE. END QUOTE, THAT IS 
INTENDED TO BE PROTECTED UNDER THE STATUTE. WHAT YOU HAVE 
HERE IS YOU HAVE TWO CORPORATIONS, BOTH ENGAGED IN THE 
[MANUFACTURING FIELD. NEITHER ONE OF THOSE CORPORATIONS ARE 
DOING THEIR WORK FOR THE GENERAL LAY PUBLIC PER SE. CHROMOLOX 
IS PRODUCING THEIR OWN UNITS FOR THEIR OWN CUSTOMERS, WHICH 
ARE INDUSTRIAL. INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING IS PRODUCING WHATEVER 
IT PRODUCES FOR, QUOTE, END QUOTE, INDIVIDUAL SPECIALIZED 
CUSTOMERS. AND THEREFORE. IT'S NOT THIS PARTICULAR STATUTE, 
|WE COME WITHIN SOME OF THE EXEMPTIONS SET FORTH IN OUR 
MEMORANDUM. ALL THAT WAS ARGUED AT THE TIME OF SUMMARV 
JUDGMENT BEFORE JUDGE ROTH. EVEN IF IT WASN'T, I WOULD MOVE 
THE COURT AT THIS POINT TO AMEND THE COUNTERCLAIM TO CONFORM 
[TO THE MOTIONS AND THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH WERE ARGUED 
BEFORE, WHICH WOULD PUT THIS IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE. 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE — ARE YOU GOING TO HAVE 


























CASE IN YOUR CASE IN CHIEFS 
MR. FANKHAUSER: YES. I HAVE MR. LINDSEY, AND IF 
NECESSARY, WE CAN BRING IN MR. ROBERT GRIFFIN WHO WAS ALSO 
CONSULTED AND THE PERSON WHO IS A LICENSED PROFESSIONAL 
ENGINEER. MR. LINDSEY IS A LICENSED PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER.WHO 
ISA STOCKHOLDER OF THE CORPORATION, WHO WAS CONSULTED AND' HAS 
BEEN INVOLVED IN THIS PROJECT FROM ITS OUTSET. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY RESPOND. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: AN AFFIDAVIT IS ON FILE FROM MR. LINDSEY 
TO THAT EFFECT. 
MR. BLACKBURN: MR. IREY'S INCORRECT. EVEN IF YOU'RE 
ALLEGING THAT IT COMES UNDER THE EXEMPTION, THE LAW REQUIRES 
THAT YOU PLEAD THE EXEMPTION IN THE CASE. THE ONLY ISSUE THAT 
WAS BEFORE JUDGE ROTH WAS WHETHER A LICENSED ENGINEER WAS 
PARTICIPATING, AND JUDGE ROTH SAID THERE WAS A FACTUAL ISSUE. 
THE CASE IS WHERE THEY HAVE TO PLEAD THAT AND IT MUST BE PLED 
IN THE COMPLAINT, IT CANNOT BE AMENDED NOW, BUT IT MUST BE 
PLED IN THE COMPLAINT. A PERSON SEEKING RECOVERY FOR PERSONAL 
SERVICE FOR WHICH A LICENSE IS REQUIRED AS A CONDITION 
PRECEDENT TO THE RENDITION THEREOF FOR A FEE MUST ALLEGE AND 
IPROVE FACTS WHICH SHOW HE WAS LICENSED AT THE TIME SUCH 
SERVICES WERE PERFORMED OR HE WAS EXEMPT FROM THE CLASS 
REQUIRED TO HAVE SUCH LICENSE. THAT MUST BE SPECIFICALLY PLED 
AND IT MUST BE SPECIFICALLY PROVEN. THERE IS NO PLEADING ON 


























MAINTAIN A CLAIM UNDER THAT WITHOUT PLEADING IT FIRST. IT'S 
VERY CLEAR FROM THE STATUTE IN THE CASE. 
THE COURT: THE COURT IS SOMEWHAT FAMILIAR WITH THE 
FILE. THE COURT NOTES THAT PROCEEDINGS TOOK PLACE IN FRONT OF 
THE OTHER DISTRICT COURT, AND BELIEVES THAT IN SUBSTANCE THE 
SAME ISSUE WHICH IS HERE PRESENTED WAS PRESENTED THERE. BOTH 
SIDES WERE PUT ON NOTICE AT THAT TIME THAT THE — IT WAS 
DEFENDANTS' CONTENTION THAT THEY'RE PREPARED TO PROVE THAT A 
LICENSED ENGINEER WAS USED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE ARTICLE 
IN QUESTION. FOR THIS REASON, THE COURT WILL DENY THE MOTION. 
IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE? 
MR. BLACKBURN: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: LET ME ALSO, WHILE I HAVE THE JURY OUT 
|FOR A MINUTE, I NOTE THAT — I BELIEVE IT'S JUDGE HYDE GAVE AN 
ORDER AND THE MACHINE IS NOW IN PLAINTIFF'S POSSESSION, IS 
THAT TRUE? 
MR. BLACKBURN: IT'S NOT IN OUR POSSESSION. IT'S IN THE 
SHERIFF'S POSSESSION IN A WAREHOUSE. I MEAN WE DON'T HAVE IT, 
IT'S IN A WAREHOUSE. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: WELL, THE SHERIFF DOESN'T HAVE 
POSSESSION. THEY'RE RENTING THE WAREHOUSE, THEY'RE PAYING THE 
[BILL, AND THEY HAVE THE KEY. THE SHERIFF HAS — IS NOT 
HOLDING IT UNDER ANY WRIT THAT I'M AWARE OF. IT WAS ORDERED 
tBY JUDGE HYDE THAT IT REMAIN THERE UNLESS IT COULD BE WORKED 




























MR. BLACKBURN: YES. THE THIRD MOTION IS, AGAIN, IS BACK 
TO THE LICENSED ENGINEERING. WE'VE MADE A MOTION ALREADY AND 
WE WOULD REINSTITUTE THE MOTION CONCERNING THAT THE COMPLAINT 
HAS NOT ALLEGED THAT A LICENSED ENGINEER AS REQUIRED BY THE 
STATUTE, AND THE COURT'S PREVIOUSLY RULED ON THAT. BUT I'M 
REINSTITUTING THAT MOTION AT THIS TIME, BUT ALSO THAT THEY 
HAVE NOT PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE CASE THAT A LICENSED ENGINEER 
MANUFACTURED THIS DOCUMENT. THE ONLY EVIDENCE BEFORE THE 
COURT IS THAT A CERTIFIED ENGINEER REVIEWED THE PLANS AND 
REVIEWED THE DESIGNS. HE NEVER CONSULTED WITH PACIFIC 
CHRDMOLOX, HE NEVER ENTERED INTO ANY AGREEMENTS, HE NEVER 
CERTIFIED OR DREW ANY PLANS, NEVER CONSULTED OR REVIEWED WITH 
A COMPLAINT, AND IT WAS ALL ON A LABOR TRADING BASIS. THIS IS 
SIMILAR TO SOMEONE GOING TO AN ATTORNEY AND HAVING THE 
ATTORNEY REVIEW DOCUMENTS AND HAVING THAT INDIVIDUAL GO 
FORWARD AND DOING THEM WITHOUT THE ATTORNEY EVER SIGNING THEM. 
AND THAT'S JUST NOT WHAT THE STATUTE IS TRYING TO PROTECT. IT 
SHOULD BE THE OTHER WAY AROUND. MR. IREY SHOULD BE WORKING 
FOR MR. LINDSEY AND NOT THE OPPOSITE WAY AROUND. AND MR. 
LINDSEY SHOULD BE THE ONE THAT'S INVOLVED IN THIS. HE 
INDICATED THAT HE HAD NOT TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 
MACHINE, THAT HE SAID HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PARTS THAT HE 
|LOOKED AT, AND THAT WAS THE STRUCTURE OF THE DESIGN. BUT 




























OF THE MRCHINE UHERE HE WAS DOING IT. THE ONLY EVIDENCE, I 
GUESS THERE'S SOME EVIDENCE, THAT'S THE I40 HOURS HE WORKED ON 
THE MACHINE THROUGH HIS TESTIMONY. AND I SUBMIT THAT THEY CAN 
ONLY RECOVER THE 140 HOURS THAT MR. LINDSEY WORKED ON THE 
MACHINE UNDER THAT PARTICULAR STATUTE. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY COMMENT. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: I BELIEVE, YOUR HONOR, THE BURDEN OF THE 
STATUTE'S BEEN MET UNEQUIVOCALLY IN TWO RESPECTS. NUMBER ONE, 
THE CORPORATION DID NOT ALLEGE TO BE A PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER 
BECAUSE A CORPORATION OBVIOUSLY CANNOT BE THAT. NUMBER TWO, 
THE STATUTE PROVIDES THAT IF YOU ARE A CORPORATION, THAT YOU 
|MUST SHOW THAT THE ENGINEERING FUNCTIONS ARE PERFORMED EITHER 
BY A LICENSED PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER OR UNDER THE SUPERVISION 
OR IN CONCERT WITH A LICENSED PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER. THE 
EVIDENCE IS UNEQUIVOCAL AND UNCONTRADICTED IN THAT RESPECT. 
|FURTHERMORE, THE STATUTE DOESN'T REQUIRE THAT THAT ENGINEER BE 
COMPENSATED. I DON'T THINK THE STATUTE SETS THE CONTRACT 
|UNDER WHICH THE PEOPLE WANT TO WORK, THAT'S IMMATERIAL, 
THIRDLY, THE HOURS THAT MR. LINDSEY TESTIFIED TO WAS 
|APPRDXIMATELY £B0, 140 ON THE MODIFICATION. THEREFORE, I 
THINK THAT'S APPROPRIATE. AND HE WORKED ON THOSE 
MODIFICATIONS, HE APPROVED THOSE THINGS, AND I THINK THAT THE 
STATUTE'S BURDEN HAS BEEN MET NOT ONLY WITH A MERE 
PREPONDERANCE, BUT WITH A SUBSTANTIAL PREPONDERANCE, AND I 



























MR. BLACKBURN: JUST TO BRIEFLY RESPOND, MR. LINDSEY IS 
NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF THE COMPANY, HE'S NOT AN OFFICER OF THE 
COMPANY, HE'S NOT A DIRECTOR OF THE COMPANY. HE'S A 
STOCKHOLDER OF THE COMPANY, THE SAME AS THE JUDGE IS PROBABLY 
A STOCKHOLDER IN SOME COMPANIES, THE SAME AS I'M A STOCKHOLDER 
IN SOME COMPANIES, BUT HE'S NOT AN OFFICER, HE'S NOT A 
DIRECTOR, HE'S NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF THAT PARTICULAR COMPANY. HE 
DOESN'T WORK FOR THEM. WHAT THAT STATUTE MEANS IS THE 
LICENSED ENGINEER WILL BE AN EMPLOYEE, OFFICER, OR DIRECTOR I 
THE COMPANY. THIS COMPANY HAS NO LICENSED ENGINEER WITH IT AT 
ALL, AS TESTIFIED TO BY MR. LINDSEY. HE WAS ONLY THERE TO 
CONSULT BECAUSE THEY'RE IN THE SAME BUILDING. HE'S NOT PART 
OF THAT CORPORATION AT ALL. 
THE COURT: THE COURT DENIES THE MOTION. THE COURT 
DOES SO FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: FIRST OF ALL, THE COURT 
BELIEVES THAT THE MATTER'S ALREADY BEEN RULED ON BY ANOTHER 
JUDGE, AND THEREFORE, IS THE LAW OF THE CASE. BUT IN ADDITION 
THERETO, THE COURT RULES THAT THE MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED, 
FIRST OF ALL, THE CORPORATION — THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE WHICH 
I HAVE BEFORE ME IS THAT THE CORPORATION DID HAVE AVAILABLE TO 
IT THE SERVICES OF LICENSED ENGINEERS WHO WERE CONCERNED WITH 
THE CONSTRUCTION AND WERE COUNSELED ON THE MATTER. IN 
ADDITION TO THIS, I BELIEVE THE EARLIER JUDGE HAS RULED THAT 
THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY ONE OF THOSE S I T U H M U N S WHERE YOU ARE 



























IS A SITUATION WHERE YOU'RE INVOLVED IN THE TECHNICAL DEALINGS 
OF CORPORATIONS, BOTH OF WHICH HAVE THE SERVICES OF TRAINED 
ENGINEERS. IS THERE ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MR. BLACKBURN: NO, YOUR HONOR. THAT'S OUR MOTIONS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. HAVE YOU HAD A CHANCE TO LOOK 
|AT THESE INSTRUCTIONS SO YOU CAN TAKE YOUR EXCEPTIONS AND 
WE'LL BE READY TO GO WITH THE JURY WHEN THEY COME BACK? 
MR. FANKHAUSER: THE ONES WE HAD THIS MORNING, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: YES. 
MR. BLACKBURN: NO. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: I HAVEN'T SEEN ANY UPDATES. 
THE COURT: HERE THEY ARE. 
MR. BLACKBURN: NO, I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO LOOK AT 
THESE. 
THE COURT: WHAT DO YOU MEAN, I GAVE THEM TO YOU LAST 
NIGHT. 
MR. BLACKBURN: THESE WEREN'T — 
MR. FANKHAUSER: WE JUST GOT THEM NOW. 
THE COURT: JUST THE TWO WORDS CHANGED IS ALL. 
MR. BLACKBURN: OKAY. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: YOU INDICATED, YOUR HONOR, THAT YOU'RE 
GOING TO ADD MAYBE ONE OR TWO. DID YOU DO THAT? 
THE COURT: I DID NOT ADD — DECIDED NOT TO ADD THEM. 




























THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT. 
MR. BLACKBURN: OKAY. I COULD TAKE MINE. I'M READY TO 
TAKE MY EXCEPTIONS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. BLACKBURN: ONE OF OUR CAUSES OF ACTION IS FOR BREACH 
OF WARRANTY. THERE'S NO INSTRUCTION TN HERE CONCERNING BREACH 
OF WARRANTY FOR THE JURY TO RULE ON. SO WE EXCEPT TO IT, THE 
LACKING OF THIS INSTRUCTION. WE SUBMITTED ONE TO THE COURT ON 
BREACH OF WARRANTY. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY TAKE YOUR EXCEPTIONS. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: AS I UNDERSTAND IT, WAS THE INSTRUCTION 
ON PROXIMATE CAUSE REMOVED? 
THE COURT: YES, TOOK ONE OUT. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: OKAY. THE DEFENDANT WOULD OBJECT TO THE 
NON GIVING OF THE INSTRUCTION REGARDING REASONABLE VALUE OF 
LABOR PERFORMED. ALSO TO THE NON-GIVING OF AN INSTRUCTION AS 
TO ESTOPPEL AND WAIVER ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF, WHERE IT 
REMOVED THE MACHINE FROM THE CUSTODY OF THE DEFENDANT AND HAS 
WITHHELD THE MACHINE FROM THE DEFENDANT SINCE THAT TIME, AND I 
THINK THAT THAT WOULD BE SOMETHING THE JURN SHOULD CONSIDER 
REGARDING WHETHER OR NOT PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN MET TO THE 
IEXTENT THAT IT WAS — THE DEFENDANT WAS ABLE TO PERFORM. AND 
THAT GOES TO THE ISSUE OF BREACH OF CONTRACT. I THINK THERE 
|SHOULD BE AN INSTRUCTION ON MEETING OF THE MINDS RELATIVE TO, 
QUOTE, END QUOTE, THE MODIFICATIONS AND CHANGES TO THESE 
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GARFF, Judge: 
Appellant Pacific Chromalox Division, Emerson Electric Co. 
(Chromalox) brought an action against respondents Richard F. Irey 
(Irey) and Industrial Engineering and Manufacturing Corp. 
(I.E.M.) for breach of contract and breach of warranty. 
Respondents counterclaimed for breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment. After a jury trial, the jury ruled in favor of 
respondents. We affirm. 
Chromalox, a subsidiary of Emerson Electric, is a 
manufacturer of industrial heating elements which it sells to 
companies that produce heating equipment for commercial 
applications. It does not sell heating elements to residential 
customers. Irey, as the president and owner of I.E.M., designs 
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and builds one-of-a-kind automated machines. I.E.M.fs staff 
includes Irey's wife, some machinists and assembly people, and 
some consulting engineers, including Joseph W. Lindsey. 
During the summer of 1982, Chromalox's manager of 
manufacturing engineering, Ned Blackett, in response to corporate 
cost-cutting targets, was interested in reducing the cost of 
Chromalox's complicated, labor intensive process for producing 
heating coils. He did not know if it was possible to build a 
machine to automate this process, but was interested in the 
possible savings that might result if such a machine could be 
built. He first offered this "high risk" project to another 
company, which declined it. Blackett then heard about Irey's 
work in automation engineering and offered the project to him. 
Irey visited the Chromalox facility, located in Ogden, Utah, 
and observed the coil production process. On about August 10, 
1982, he hand-carried a proposal for the machine to Chromalox and 
met with Blackett. He told Blackett that he could build a 
machine to duplicate the process exactly. Blackett told Irey 
that he could not pay more than $75,000 for the machine because 
of corporate financial restrictions, but if the machine worked, 
Chromalox might be interested in a second machine for another 
plant, and that Chromalox had need of other types of automated 
machinery which Irey might be able to build. 
On November 2, 1982, I.E.ML, through Irey, agreed to 
manufacture the machine for Chromalox for $69,896 plus tax, with 
delivery to take place in fourteen to sixteen weeks. Irey 
arrived at this price by subtracting the requisite amount of 
sales tax from Chromalox*s $75,000 ceiling. He deliberately 
underbid the project, which he figured would cost about $120,000 
to complete, because he felt, on the basis of Blackett's 
representations that a second machine might be needed and that 
Chromalox was interested in additional automated machinery, that 
it was an investment in his future business. To meet the price 
ceiling, Irey and Blackett agreed to eliminate a washer orienter 
called for in the original specifications. 
Blackett filed a purchase requisition for the machine on 
November 9, 1982. Specifications set forth in the purchase order 
included the following: The machine was to be capable of 
applying a stud on both ends of a heating coil, which could range 
in diameter from .06" to .115", at a minimum rate of 600 coils 
per hour. It was to accept coils made from twenty to thirty-two 
gauge wire, was to be designed and constructed for continuous 
service, and was to allow for convenient servicing and repairs. 
The purchase order specified a delivery date of February 1, 
1983. I.E.M. was to test the machine at its facility prior to 
delivery. Chromalox was to pay I.E.M. fifty percent of the 
contract amount upon satisfactory completion of the machine, with 
the remainder due within thirty days. 
I.E.M. did not begin production of the machine until after 
December 7, 1982, when Chromalox sent required documentation 
regarding some of the specifications. About this time, Blackett 
became aware that the previously eliminated washer orienting 
device might be necessary to duplicate the manufacturing 
process. He discussed the problem with Irey, who told him that 
it would not be any problem to put a little orienter mechanism on 
the machine. They did not discuss any price increase or 
extension of the delivery date for the machine. 
On March 31, 1983, approximately sixteen weeks later, Irey 
delivered the uncompleted machine to Chromalox1s facility at 
Blackett's request, because Blackett needed to demonstrate it to 
"corporate people" from Emerson Electric. Irey indicated that it 
would take two to three weeks to complete the machine, but that 
it was to the point that he could complete it at Chromalox's 
plant. Because of its uncompleted condition, Chromalox did not 
pay for the machine at this time. 
However, by April 1983, the machine was still not producing 
heating coil assemblies, and had numerous problems. First, the 
parties finally determined that addition of the washer orienter 
was necessary. Second, the washer dispenser on the machine 
continually jammed. Although Chromalox suggests that this 
problem was the result of Irey's poor design, Irey indicated that 
the washers supplied by Chromalox may have caused much of the 
problem: He stated that it is understood in the automation 
industry that you will get washers free from burrs, deformations, 
and dirt because an automated machine cannot handle nonidentical 
parts. Even though Chromalox1s specifications stated that the 
washers used for production by the machine would be flat and free 
from burrs, they were not. Instead, they were nonidentical in 
shape and were mixed with bits of rock left from Chromalox1s 
deburring operation. Consequently, Irey maintained that the 
problems encountered with the washer dispenser were a result of 
the poor quality of the washers. Finally, Irey and Chromalox 
engineers determined that it would be necessary to add a 
previously uncontemplated coil centering device to the machine. 
In its initial specifications, Chromalox had represented that the 
coils used on the machine would be manufactured to within plus or 
minus one coil diameter in length. However, the coils provided 
by Chromalox did not conform to this standard. According to 
Irey, the coil centering device was a necessary modification to 
compensate for Chromalox's lack of quality control, but 
interfered with the operation of the rest of the machine. 
During the ensuing year, Irey continued to work part time, 
together with Chromalox engineers, on the machine at: the 
Chromalox plant. He spent a considerable amount of time on two 
unsuccessful attempts to design and install the washer orienter 
while Chromalox engineers constantly changed the specifications 
for the machine. 
Although the machine was not operational during this period, 
never producing more than ten or twelve coil assemblies at a 
time, Chromalox paid Irey the total contract amount for the 
machine by October 4, 1983 because Irey was facing extreme 
financial pressures. Blackett told Irey that if the machine 
worked, Chromalox would be willing to pay I.E.M. an additional 
$30,000 for the design and engineering package as an attempt to 
compensate him for the additional engineering work. 
On March 26, 1984, Blackett authorized the machine's return 
to I.E.M.fs facility in Salt Lake City for the purpose of 
refining the washer feeder and finding a way to orient the 
washers. During the ensuing ninety days, Irey again redesigned 
the washer orienter. However, the machine developed additional 
problems related to the washer feeder and washer orienter. 
Irey returned the machine to Chromalox in June 1984, 
representing that it would produce about 250 parts per hour and 
that Chromalox could start training an operator. However, the 
machine continually jammed after producing only a few parts. 
Nevertheless, Chromalox trained two operators. One of them, 
Carolyn Cromwell, stated that she operated the machine on and off 
for about two months, that the machine only produced twenty-five 
coils per hour and seven coils in one sequence, and that it was 
always jamming and was under repair more than it was operational. 
In October 1984, the parties decided to further modify the 
machine by adding another operation, cutting off the "pigtail" 
hook on the heating coils, which required the machine's return to 
I.E.M.'s facility. Blackett told Irey that he did not care what 
Irey did to the machine but that it had to produce 400 parts per 
hour to be acceptable, and claimed that this request was simply 
for a modification of Irey's design, not a modification of the 
original specification. 
The transfer order authorizing the machine's return to 
I.E.M., dated November 1, 1984, indicated that there was to be no 
charge for this work. Irey, however, testified that he had not 
seen or agreed to this order prior to the trial. On November 5, 
1984, Chromalox shipped the machine to I.E.M.'s facility by 
common carrier. Because of Chromalox1s admitted negligence, the 
machine was damaged during shipping. Robert Slater, a senior 
Chromalox engineer, went to I.E.M.'s facility, verified the 
damage, and authorized Irey to repair the damage and bill 
Chromalox for the $1,500 repair cost. Chromalox never paid for 
this repair, although Blackett alleges that he deducted it from 
expenses which Chromalox had incurred on Irey's behalf. Because 
Irey understood, from Blackett's comments, that he was to "go 
ahead" with the machine, he designed, extensively tested, and 
debugged a fourth washer orienter and installed it on the 
machine. Having done this, he videotaped the machine operating 
at the rate of 500 coil assemblies per hour, and with the 
assistance of his consulting engineer, ran timing tests which 
came out at 7.14 seconds per cycle, a rate of about 505 parts per 
hour. 
In March or April 1985, Irey arranged for Chromalox 
representatives to come to the I.E.M. facility for a 
demonstration of the machine. Irey requested that they bring new 
coils for the demonstration because the old coils were bent and 
damaged from repeated testing. Chromalox representatives, 
however, forgot to bring the new coils, so Irey was forced to use 
the old, damaged ones for the demonstration. Consequently, the 
machine malfunctioned during the demonstration. However, one 
Chromalox representative, Slater, indicated that he watched the 
machine, which had undergone considerable changes, operate 
through its cycle for about ten minutes with the reclaimed coils, 
and stated that it "looked excellent." He observed that the 
machine could be run at 400 parts per hour, but was unable to run 
400 parts because Irey had insufficient coils to do so. He also 
testified that the additional parts put on the machine at 
Chromalox's request slowed it down, and that he was expecting to 
pay approximately $10,000 for the modifications to the machine. 
Blackett, however, stated that the machine would only cycle at a 
rate of 287 parts per hour and would break down after several 
minutes of operation. 
Irey asserts that the changes and modifications Chromalox 
requested after March 31, 1983 required additional engineering 
and materials valued at $185,817. He states that this amount 
represents nothing but modifications, and he had subtracted out 
expenses for which he felt responsible. After the demonstration, 
Irey was willing to settle with Blackett for $52,000 for these 
changes, and demanded payment. In response, Blackett told Irey 
that Chromalox would not pay any more for the machine, that 
Chromalox owned it, and that Chromalox representatives would come 
and pick it up. He testified that Irey never billed him for the 
alleged modifications and that the only modification he requested 
was the washer centering device. He further alleged that 
Chromalox never accepted the machine as completed because it 
never functioned according to the specifications; that Chromalox 
had provided Irey with sufficient coils, washers, and bolts to 
complete and demonstrate the machine; and that Chromalox had paid 
Irey in full for the machine. Irey asserted a lien against the 
machine to secure payment of the amounts he claimed, and kept the 
machine. 
On April 25, 1985, Chromalox sued respondents, requesting a 
writ of attachment on the machine. The court granted Chromalox1s 
writ, and ordered that the machine should be taken from I.E.M.'s 
facility and stored in a storage unit under the control of the 
Salt Lake County sheriff. Respondents moved to quash the writ 
and answered Chromalox*s complaint. On November 6, 1985, 
Chromalox filed an amended complaint, requesting the return of 
the machine, $81,868.87 in damages, reasonable attorney fees and 
costs, and $20,000 in punitive damages. Respondents asserted a 
counterclaim, demanding $186,817 in damages. 
On February 5, 1986, Chromalox moved for summary judgment, 
raising the issue that Irey was prevented from seeking relief 
through Utah courts, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-22-20 
(1963), because he was not authorized to practice as an 
engineer. Irey opposed the motion, indicating that Joseph 
Lindsey, a licensed professional engineer, had been on I.E.M.'s 
staff at all relevant times, and that Robert Griffin, also a 
licensed professional engineer, had done engineering work on the 
machine. The court denied Chromalox's motion. 
A jury trial was held on November 17, 1987. The jury found 
in favor of Irey and awarded him damages against Chromalox of 
$92,500, accrued interest of $24,281, and costs of $649.75. On 
January 15, 1988, the trial court amended the judgment, awarding 
Irey $92,500, $23,895.91 in accrued interest, $285.45 in costs, 
and awarded possession of the machine to Chromalox. Chromalox 
brought this appeal. 
The parties raise the following issues on appeal: (1) May 
respondents recover for breach of contract, given the engineering 
licensing provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-22-20 (1963); and (2) 
did the trial court commit reversible error by refusing to give 
Chromalox*s requested jury instruction on breach of warranty? 
I. 
ENGINEERING LICENSE 
The major issue raised by the parties is whether, under the 
relevant provisions of the Engineers' and Surveyors1 Licensing 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-22-1 to -25 (1963), respondents may 
recover for breach of contract. 
Chromalox argues that section 58-22-20 bars I.E.M. from 
seeking any relief through the courts because I.E.M., through 
Irey, practiced engineering in the state of Utah without a 
license. I.E.M., however, argues that it is not precluded from 
enforcing its contract because: (1) Chromalox is not a member of 
the protected class, the lay public, but rather, Chromalox is an 
industrial manufacturer which sells only to industrial and 
commercial users; (2) Irey believed that he was acting in 
compliance with the statute by hiring licensed engineers to work 
on the Chromalox project; and (3) there is evidence upon which 
the jury could reasonably conclude that the machine worked. 
At the outset, we note that the record clearly indicates 
Irey practiced engineering in the state of Utah without a 
license. Relevant provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-22-2 (1963) 
define the practice of engineering as: 
the performance of any professional 
service or creative work requiring 
engineering education, training and 
experience, and the application of special 
knowledge of the mathematical, physical, 
and engineering sciences to such 
professional services or creative work as 
consultation, investigation, evaluation, 
planning, design, and supervision of 
construction for the purpose of assuring 
compliance with specifications and design, 
in connection with the utilization of the 
forces, energies, and materials of nature 
in the development, production, and 
functioning of engineering processes, 
apparatus, machines, equipment, . . . 
employed in or devoted to public or 
private enterprise or uses. 
Similarly, the term ''practice of engineering" "comprehends the 
practice of those branches of engineering, the pursuit of any of 
which affects the safety of life, health or property, or the 
public welfare." Utah Code Ann. § 58-22-2 (1963). By designing 
and constructing the machine, Irey unquestionably engaged in 
creative work and professional services requiring application of 
the physical and engineering sciences. It is undisputed, also, 
that Irey was not licensed according to the terms of the 
statute. He held no other engineering license or college degree, 
and had not engaged in any formal engineering education. 
Section 58-22-2 further states that: 
[a] person shall be construed to practice 
or offer to practice engineering, within 
the meaning and intent of this act, . . . 
who holds himself out as able to perform, 
or who does perform any engineering 
service or work or any other professional 
service designated by the practitioner or 
recognized by educational authorities as 
engineering. 
The evidence on the record warrants the inference that Irey 
held himself out as being able to perform certain engineering 
services, so, under this provision, he should be construed to 
have practiced engineering during the relevant times. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-22-21 (1963) lists the circumstances 
under which a practitioner might be exempted from the licensing 
requirement. The only arguably applicable exemption to the 
licensing requirement is contained in section 58-22-21(d), 
which states: 
This act shall not be construed to prevent 
or apply to . . . The work of an employee 
or a subordinate of a person holding a 
certificate of registration under this 
act, or an employee of a person exempted 
from registration by this section; 
provided such work does not include 
responsible charge of design or 
supervision . . . . 
The facts clearly establish that Irey was not merely an employee 
or subordinate of Lindsey, but that they collaborated on an equal 
basis, and that Irey had primary responsibility for design and 
manufacturing of the machine. Thus, this sectiir*" T* nnt" 
a££XJLcabl§/ and Irey is not exempt from the licensing requirement. 
Because Irey practiced engineering as defined by the Act 
and is not exempted from its provisions, he comes under its 
provisions, including section 58-22-20 which states, in relevant 
part, that: 
[n]o person shall bring or maintain any 
action in the courts of this state for 
enforcement of any contract or the 
recovery of any sums due in connection 
with the practice of engineering or land 
surveying in this state as defined herein, 
without alleging and proving that he was 
duly authorized to practice under the 
provisions of this act . . . .1 
There is no Utah case law specifically interpreting this 
provision or other, similar provisions. However, the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated, regarding the status of unlicensed 
practitioners, that: 
[i]f the purpose of licensing is to 
protect the public, then the general rule 
in this State is that the party who does 
not obtain a license, but is required to 
do so, cannot obtain relief to enforce the 
terms of his contract — including payment 
thereunder — even though there are other 
penalties imposed against him expressly by 
statute including criminal sanctions. 
Georae v. Oren Ltd. & Assocs., 672 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 1983) 
(quoting Fillmore Prods., Inc. v. Western States Paving, Inc., 
561 P.2d 687, 689 (Utah 1977)) (emphasis in original); 
1. Under the new version of the comparable statute, M[a] 
person who is not licensed under the provisions of this chapter 
may not bring or maintain any action in the courts of this 
state for enforcement of any contract or the recovery of any 
sums due in connection with the practice of engineering . . . 
in this state.n This statute was enacted by ch. 24, 1986 Utah 
Laws, effective April 28, 1986, which repealed the former 
sections 58-22-1 to -22 as enacted by ch. 118, 1955 Utah Laws. 
Because the events leading to this appeal occurred from 1982 to 
1985, prior to the effective date of the new statute, the old 
version applies. 
gee also Heber Valley Truck, Inc. v. Utah Coal & Energy, Inc., 
611 P.2d 389, 391 (Utah 1980); Moslev v. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 
348, 453 P.2d 149, 152 (1969); Smith v. American Packing & 
Provision Co., 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951, 957 (1942). This 
general rule was adopted in connection with licensing statutes 
which did not specifically provide, as does section 58-22-20, 
that an unlicensed practitioner cannot maintain an action in 
the state's courts to enforce the terms of his contracts. See 
e.g., Loader v. Scott Constr. Corp., 681 P.2d 1227, 1229 (Utah 
1984). Because section 58-22-20 only states explicitly what 
the general rule has been held to be, we interpret the statute 
consistently with the case law which has developed under the 
general rule. 
The general rule is not applied unconditionally, but only 
under circumstances in which the "party from whom the 
contractor seeks to recover is in the class the legislature 
intended to protect." Lignell v. Berg. 593 P.2d 800, 805 (Utah 
1979); sefi also George, 672 P.2d at 735; Heber Valley Truck, 
Inc., 611 P.2d at 391. The purpose behind taking this approach 
is to avoid unreasonable penalties and forfeitures which go, 
not to the state, but to repudiating defendants. Fillmore 
Prods., Inc. v. Western States Paving. Inc.. 561 P.2d 687, 689 
(Utah 1977); s&S. also Loader, 681 P.2d at 1229; Heber Vallev 
Truck. Inc., 611 P.2d at 391; Lignell. 593 P.2d at 805. Laws 
intended for protecting the public are not intended to become 
"an unwarranted shield for the avoidance of a just obligation,H 
Fillmore Prodst/ 561 P.2d at 690 (quoting Matchett v. Gould, 
131 Cal. App. 2d 821, 281 P.2d 524 (1955)) and should not allow 
a "defendant to take the benefit of an unlicensed plaintiff's 
labor and refuse to pay for it." Heber Valley Truck, Inc., 611 
P.2d at 391. 
"A litigant is not a member of [the class the legislature 
intended to protect] if the required protection . . . is in 
fact afforded by another means," Lignell, 593 P.2d at 805, such 
as the litigant being licensed in the same trade or profession 
as the unlicensed practitioner. See e.g., Heber Valley Truck, 
Inc., 611 P.2d at 391-92; Lignell, 592 P.2d at 805; Fillmore 
Prods., 561 P.2d at 689. In Fillmore Products, a licensed 
contractor who contracted for services with an unlicensed 
contractor was not allowed to invoke the general rule 
prohibiting the unlicensed contractor from initiating an action 
for payment because the unlicensed contractor's work had met 
all the requirements and specifications of the general contract 
and the entire project was under the supervision of a licensed 
project engineer. Fillmore Prods., 561 P.2d at 689; see also 
Heber Valley Truck. Inc., 611 P.2d at 391-92. In Loader v. 
Scott Construction Corp., the Utah Supreme Court found that the 
defendant from whom the unlicensed contractor demanded payment 
was a licensed contractor, so did not belong to the class of 
persons the general rule was intended to protect, the lay 
public, because he was presumed to possess expertise in the 
contracting business which would enable him to protect 
himself. Loader, 681 P.2d at 1229. Significantly, the 
defendant did not complain at trial that the unlicensed 
contractor's work was unsatisfactory, so the court assumed that 
the contractor's performance met the defendant's expectations. 
Id. Ultimately, the court found in favor of the unlicensed 
contractor because (1) the defendant was not a member of the 
class the statute was intended to protect, (2) the unlicensed 
contractor fully performed the contract and the defendant would 
be unfairly benefitted by avoiding payment, and (3) the 
unlicensed contractor's unlicensed status was the result of a 
good faith mistake, id. at 1230. 
This court will reverse a judgment based upon a jury 
verdict only if, "viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, there is no substantial evidence to 
support it." Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 417 
(Utah 1989) (quoting In re Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 88 
(Utah 1985)). Where there is conflicting evidence, "we assume 
that the jury believed those facts that support its verdict . . 
., and we view the facts and the reasonable inferences that 
arise from those facts in a light most supportive of the jury's 
verdict." Canyon Country Store, 781 P.2d at 417 (quoting 
Bennjon vy liggrgnd Johnson Constat CQt, 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 
(Utah 1985)). 
In the present case, the Chromalox employees involved with 
the project were either licensed engineers or working under the 
direction of licensed engineers. Ned Blackett was a licensed 
engineer, as was Charles Ashburn, a manufacturing engineer who 
assisted Irey with design. Mark Coy, the primary Chromalox 
engineer on the project, was an engineering student working 
under Blackett's direction. Under Loader, Chromalox is, thus, 
presumed to possess expertise in engineering so "is not in need 
of the protection the licensing statute was intended to provide 
to the lay public." Loader, 681 P.2d at 1229.2 
2. Although the focus under Loader is solely on whether the 
party refusing payment has the very expertise which the 
Although substantially controverted, the record further 
contains evidence from which the jury could conclude that the 
machine worked according to the required specifications as 
revised by Chromalox.3 Likewise, although Irey was not in 
compliance with the licensing statute, the record contains 
evidence from which the jury could conclude that Irey was 
engaged in a good faith effort to comply with the statute. See 
footnote 2. 
(footnote 2 continued) 
licensing statute is designed to insure, we note that the 
possibility of any actual harm in this case was also greatly 
minimized by the availability of engineering expertise to 
Irey. In addition to Chromalox*s in-house expertise, several 
registered engineers worked on, approved, and certified the 
project design for I.E.M. Joseph W. Lindsey, a licensed 
engineer, regularly consulted with I.E.M. on various projects, 
including Chromalox1s machine, prior to and during the 
manufacturing stages. He routinely reviewed Irey's designs and 
suggested whatever modifications he felt were required to make 
better use of the materials or to strengthen the machine. 
Although Lindsey was not an officer or employee of I.E.M., he 
was a stockholder, and was involved with the Chromalox project 
at virtually every step, spending about 140 hours on it. He 
worked on the preliminary design, the design of the frame, and 
the running of tests and analyses on the machine to assure that 
it was sound. He certified the machine design and contracted 
to have the machine built in his machine shop. Irey also 
employed Robert M. Griffin, a registered professional engineer, 
to perform computations and stress analyses on the machine. 
Griffin testified that Irey's design was more than adequate and 
was capable of operating safely and reliably from a mechanical 
standpoint. Irey additionally engaged Robert Kirk, also a 
registered engineer, to design the computer and software 
packages. 
3. We note here that 
[t]he question on appeal from a judgment based on a jury 
verdict is not whether there is substantial evidence which 
would have supported a contrary verdict, or even whether 
this Court, had it been trier of fact, would have reached 
the same verdict as that reached by the jury. Rather, the 
issue is whether the jury's findings are supported by 
substantial competent evidence. 
Canyon Country Storg, 781 P.2d at 418 (quoting In re Estate of 
Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 95 (Utah 1985)). 
We conclude that Chromalox is not a member of the 
legislatively protected class and that/ under these facts, 
preventing Irey from bringing his action against Chromalox 
would result in an unreasonable forfeiture. We, therefore, 
find that I.E.M- may recover for breach of contract under the 
provisions of section 58-22-20, and affirm the trial court's 
judgment. 
II. Jury Instructions 
Chromalox demands reversal of the jury verdict, alleging 
that the trial court committed prejudicial error by excluding 
its requested breach of warranty instruction, 
Chromalox's attorney submitted the following jury 
instruction, which the trial court declined to give: 
Under the written agreement entered 
into on November 2, 1982, the defendant 
specifically agreed to produce a machine 
for $69,896.00 plus sales tax, which would 
produce 400 accepted bolt to coil 
terminals of diameter .06 to .115M, coil 
length of 2H to 48," [sic] from wire 
gauges from 20 to 32, continuous service, 
convenient servicing and adjustment and/or 
replacing of components. This agreement 
warrants and binds the defendant to make a 
machine which would accomplish these 
specific functions. 
In the event the defendant failed to 
produce a machine which would specifically 
meet each of the functions successfully, 
he would be in breach of his promise or 
warranty and the plaintiff would be 
entitled to its damages. 
Instead, the trial court gave the following instruction, in 
relevant part: 
The plaintiff alleges defendant made 
them a written offer to build the 
plaintiff a machine that would do specific 
things in a set time frame. The plaintiff 
further alleges that the plaintiff 
accepted the written offer in writing and 
has, in fact, paid in full for the 
machine. The plaintiff alleges that 
defendant has had more time than a 
reasonable time to perform, and that the 
plaintiffs now have the machine and it is 
not as ordered and is in fact worthless. 
Plaintiffs therefore claim that they are 
entitled to have their monies returned 
plus damages they have suffered because of 
the breach of contract. The plaintiff 
further alleges that even if the jury were 
to find it to be a fact (which plaintiff 
denies) that plaintiff; [sic] damaged the 
machine, requested additional features be 
placed on the machine, or requested a 
machine that would handle previously 
unanticipated imperfections in the coils 
and washers, that the defendant has still 
had adequate time in which to perform; and 
that they are therefore entitled to most 
of their money back, as well as damages 
for breach of contract. 
The remainder of this instruction set forth I.E.M.'s theory 
of the case and submitted the allegations of fact to the jury for 
its determination. Subsequent to the trial court's charge to the 
jury, Chromalox's counsel objected to the trial court's failure 
to give its requested instruction, stating: 
One of our causes of action is for breach 
of warranty. There's no instruction in 
here concerning breach of warranty for the 
jury to rule on. So we except to it, the 
lacking of this instruction. We submitted 
one to the court on breach of warranty. 
The court allowed Chromalox's exception, but stated that it 
would go with the instructions as outlined because it believed 
that "comment on some specific items would—that are requested 
would actually constitute a comment on the evidence. The court 
believes these matters are open to argument." 
It is the trial court's duty to cover both parties' 
theories and points of law in giving jury instructions, 
provided that there is competent evidence to support them. 
Power v. Gene's Bldcr. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 
1977); Black v. McKniaht, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977); Newsom 
v. Gold Cross Serv., Inc., 779 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). However, the trial court may properly refuse to give 
instructions if they do not accurately reflect the law 
governing the factual situation of the case, Black, 562 P.2d at 
622, or if they tend to mislead the jury to the prejudice of 
the complaining party or erroneously advise on the law. See 
Mikkelson v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Upon review of the record and Chromalox's requested 
instruction, we agree with the trial court. The requested 
instruction set forth as fact two controverted issues: that 
defendants had actually and specifically agreed to the terms 
set forth in the instruction, which corresponded with the 
original purchase order rather than the alleged changes which 
evolved over the course of production of the machine; and that 
defendants had not successfully produced the machine. Because 
the instruction implied that these issues had already been 
decided, we find that the court appropriately exercised its 
discretion because the instruction could have misled the jury 
to respondents' prejudice. We, therefore, find Chromalox's 
argument to be without merit. 
WE CONCUR: 
fluauvjfo+i. 
Russe l l W. Bench, Judge 
